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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Brian C. Cobler appeals from the judgment of conviction imposed upon his 
guilty plea to sexual battery of a child sixteen or seventeen years old, challenging 
his sentence and the orders denying his motion to modify the no contact order 
and his Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Cobler and his wife Angela Reed (Reed) had sexual relations with J.M., a 
seventeen year old girl. (Grand Jury Hr'g Tr., pp.7-83.) Cobler was indicted for 
two sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age after (1) he 
and Reed engaged in oral-genital and genital-genital contact with J.M. and (2) 
Cobler engaged in genital-anal contact with J.M. (R., pp.8-TO.) The district court 
entered a No Contact Order prohibiting Cobler from contacting or being within 
100 feet of J.M. and all other minor children. (R., p.7.) 
Cobler plead guilty to count one of the indictment and count two was 
dismissed in exchange for the state's agreement to limit its sentencing 
recommendation to no more than ten years with two years fixed. (R., pp.9, 21- 
26; Change of Plea Hr'g held 02/16/2007, pp.4-5.) On June 7, 2007, the district 
court sentenced Cobler to ten years in prison, with two years fixed. (R., pp.33- 
35.) Cobler filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.36-38.) 
On September 12, 2007, Cobler filed a motion for reduction of sentence to 
five years with one year fixed and a motion to modify the protective order to allow 
him to see his three biological children. (Order augmenting the record dated 
January 22, 2008, with items 1, 2, and 3.) The district court denied Cobier's 
motions. (Order augmenting the record dated January 22, 2008, with items 3 
and 4.) 
ISSUES 
Cobler states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court act outside the bounds of its authority 
when it entered a no contact order that is unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad, unduly restrictive of Mr. Cobler's 
fundamental right to maintain contact with his children, and 
invalid due to a lack of any discernable date of expiration of 
being limited to a named person against whom contact is 
prohibited; and when it denied Mr. Cobler's motion to modify 
the no contact order? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a 
unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. 
Cobler following his plea of guilty to sexual battery of a minor 
child, sixteen or seventeen years of age 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Cobler's Rule 35 Motion for Reduction of Sentence? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Should this Court decline to review Cobler's challenge to the no contact 
order where his constitutional attacks are being raised for the first time on 
appeal and Cobler's parental rights have been terminated? 
2. Has Cobler failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion 
when it imposed a ten year sentence, with two years fixed, upon Cobler's 
guilty plea to sexual battery of a minor child, sixteen or seventeen years of 
age? 
3. Has Cobler failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion 
when it denied his Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
This Court Should Decline To Consider Cobler's Constitutional Challenqes To 
The No Contact Order Because They Are Beinq Raised For The First Time On 
Appeal And Cobler's Parental Riqhts Have Been Terminated 
Early in the case (R., p.4) the district court entered a No Contact Order 
prohibiting Cobler from contracting J.M. and all minors (R., p.7). After the 
judgment of conviction was entered (R., p.33), Cobler filed a motion to modify the 
no contact order so that he could see his children, which the district court denied 
(Order augmenting the record dated January 22, 2008, with item 3). For the first 
time on appeal, Cobler contends the no contact order is overbroad, vague, 
infringes upon his parental rights (Appellant's brief, pp.5-26), does not have a 
definite termination date and prohibits contact with all minors (Appellant's brief, 
pp.26-30). Cobler did not raise any of his constitutional claims and he did not 
challenge the no contact order's termination "upon dismissal of this case,"' or its 
scope prohibiting contact with "all minors" (R., p.7) before the district court (Order 
augmenting the record dated January 22, 2008, with item 3, pp.2-3). Cobler's 
motion to modify the no contact order consisted only of a plea to the court to 
permit him to see his children, explaining "Child Protection took our children out 
of daycare and immediately placed them in foster care, stating imminent danger 
as reasoning" and "Health and Welfare is now attempting to terminate my rights 
as a father. I beg this court rules for modification of this no contact order to not 
' Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2(a)(3) expressly requires that a No Contact Order 
provide "the order will expire at 11:59 p.m. on a specific date, or upon dismissal 
include my children." (Order augmenting the record dated January 22, 2008, 
with item 3, pp.2-3.) All the no contact order issues he argues on appeal are 
being raised for the first time on appeal. 
A party generally cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal. State 
v. Lavy, 121 ldaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992); State v. Garcia, 102 
ldaho 378, 387, 630 P.2d 665, 674 (1981). It is a long standing rule in ldaho that 
an appellate court will not consider issues, including constitutional issues, that 
are presented for the first time on appeal. State v. Martin, 119 ldaho 577, 579, 
808 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991); State v. Fry, 128 ldaho 50, 54-55, 910 P.2d 164, 
168-69 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Hvde, 122 ldaho 604, 605, 836 P.2d 550, 551 
(Ct. App. 1992). "Moreover, an objection on one ground will not be deemed 
sufficient to preserve for appeal all objections that could have been raised." 
State v. Stevens, 115 ldaho 457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing 
State V. Chaffin, 92 ldaho 629, 448 P.2d 243 (1968)). Failure to raise an issue in 
the district court, thereby denying the trial court the opportunity to rule on the 
alleged error, constitutes a waiver of that issue on appeal. m, 119 ldaho at 
579, 808 P.2d at 1324; State v. Mauro, 121 ldaho 178, 181, 824 P.2d 109, 112 
(1991); State v. Smith, 130 ldaho 450, 454, 942 P.2d 574, 578 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Cobler's plea to see his children in the face of the state's effort to terminate his 
parental rights was not sufficient to preserve his constitutional challenges to the 
no contact order, the alleged lack of an ending date, or the order's scope of all 
of the case. (Emphasis added). The term of the No Contact Order stating it will 
expire "upon dismissal of this case" is entirely consistent with Rule 46.2. 
5 
minors. Stevens, 115 Idaho at 459, 767 P.2d at 834. Having failed to raise his 
issues below, Cobler has failed to preserve the issues for appellate review. 
Furthermore, undersigned counsel has contacted the Ada County 
Prosecutor's office and the Department of Health and Welfare and learned that 
Cobier's parental rights have been terminated. The record of the parental rights 
termination action is sealed.' Because Cobler is raising his no contact order 
issues for the first time on appeal, there is no ruling on these issues for this court 
to review. Accordingly, this court should decline to address his issues. 
/I. 
Cobler Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused its Discretion 
When it Imposed A Ten Year Sentence With Two Years Fixed Upon His Plea Of 
Guilty To Sexual Batten/ Of A Minor Child Sixteen Or Seventeen Years Old 
A. Introduction 
Cobler argues that, due to his violent and unstable childhood, his use of 
drugs impairing his judgment when he committed the crime, his poor impulse 
control and attention deficit disorder, and lack of psychological counseling, the 
district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence for the 
sexual battery of J.M. (Appellant's brief, pp.30-34.) Considering any view of the 
facts, Cobler has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing a ten year sentence with two years fixed upon his guilty plea to sexual 
battery of seventeen year old J.M., a vulnerable mentally ill child with a history of 
drug addiction whom Cobler reintroduced to drugs and had sexual intercourse 
with. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a defendant alleges an excessive sentence on appeal the appellate 
court conducts an independent review of the record that considers the nature of 
the offense, the defendant's character and protection of society. State v. Reinke, 
103 ldaho 771, 772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). "Absent a showing of 
a clear abuse of discretion, a sentence within statutory limits will not be disturbed 
on appeal." State v. Hedaer, 115 ldaho 598, 604, 768 P.2d 1331, 1337 (1989). 
C. The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Im~osinq A Ten Year 
Sentence With Two Years Fixed Upon Cobler's Guiltv Plea To Sexual 
Battery 
To determine whether the trial court abused its sentencing discretion, an 
appellate court considers "the defendant's entire sentence, State v. Huffman, 144 
ldaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)." State v. Oliver, 144 ldaho 722, 727, 170 P.3d 
387, 392 (2007). The appellate court "presume[s] that the fixed portion of the 
sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement." m r ,  144 
ldaho at 727, 170 P.3d at 392 (m State v. Trevino, 132 ldaho 888, 980 P.2d 
552 (1999)). "[Wlhether or not a defendant serves longer than the fixed portion 
of the sentence is a matter left to the sole discretion of the parole board, and 
'courts cannot intrude on this discretion when fashioning a sentence nor when 




P.3d 838, 840 (2007)). The appellate court independently reviews "all of the 
facts and circumstances of the case," including the record, and considers the 
nature of the offense and the character of the offender. State v. Cope, 142 ldaho 
492, 500, 129 P.3d 1241, 1249 (2006). To prevail, the appellant must establish 
that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence is excessive 
considering the objectives of criminal punishment. State v. Stover, 140 ldaho 
927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those objectives are "(1) protection of 
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the 
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing." 
State v. Cross, 132 ldaho 667, 671, 978 P.2d 227, 231 (1999) (internal citations 
omitted). "A sentence is reasonable if at the time of imposition it appears 
necessary to achieve 'the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve 
any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution 
applicable to the given case."' m, 144 ldaho at 727-28, 170 P.3d at 392-93 
(quoting State v. Lundauist, 134 ldaho 831, 836, 1 I P.3d 27, 32 (2000)). Where 
reasonable minds might differ, the sentences imposed by the district court must 
stand. State v. Toohill, 103 ldaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Sexual battery, which thirty-seven year old Cobier admitted he committed 
upon seventeen year old J.M. by oral-to-genital and genital-to-genital contact 
(Change of Plea Hr'g Tr., p.8, L.19 - p.9, L.14) is punishable by up to life in 
prison. I.C. 3 18-1508A(4). Cobler's sentence of only ten years, of which he will 
presumably only serve two years, is well within statutory limits. 
The presentence report reflects that Cobler met J.M., a mentally ill child 
with a history of substance abuse, through his wife, that he reintroduced J.M. to 
drugs, engaged in varied sex acts with her, and manipulated and coerced her to 
continue his sexual activities. (Grand Jury Hr'g Tr., pp.7-83; PSI, pp.2-8; PSI 
Addendum, police reports.) In the presentence interview, Cobler only admitted 
having sex with J.M. one time. (PSI, p.9.) Cobler told the presentence 
investigator that he has a misdemeanor conviction for domestic violence in 
Kansas (PSI, pp.10-11) and his prior criminal history reflects a misdemeanor 
conviction of possession of marijuana and paraphernalia in Boise in 2005 (PSI, 
At sentencing, J.M.'s mother gave a victim statement indicating her 
seventeen year old daughter was mentally ill and, because of the physical 
trauma Cobbler inflicted on J.M., she is unable to undergo a regular 
gynecological examination. (Sent. Hr'g Tr., p.6, L.25 - p.7, L.19.) In imposing 
the state's plea agreement bound recommendation of a ten year sentence, with 
two years fixed, the district court considered the psychosexual evaluation's 
indication he was a moderate risk to commit future offenses if in community 
based treatment, and concluded: 
[tlhis is about very inappropriate sexual contact with not only a 
vulnerable underage woman, but this whole interaction involving 
yourself, your wife and this young woman is - the best way I can 
describe it is it is extremely inappropriate. There's no - nothing 
positive can come out of it. 
So the Court looks at this from the standpoint that it is very, 
very serious. We protect our children, whether they are a month 
t h  . away from their 18 birthday or years away. We also protect and 
have a duty to protect young men and women who are vulnerable, 
obviously vulnerable, as I think J[.M.] was. And either you knew 
that - and I sense that you did know that and you took advantage 
of it. 
And I believe that you have understated not only the amount 
of sexual contact you had with this young woman, but I think you 
have also minimized the amount of drug use that you said was 
going on. I really do. 
And what concerns me is you didn't view yourself as a 
sexual offender, not did you perceive the 17-year-old female in this 
crime to be a victim. 
And your condition is such that your have a propensity 
towards impulsive behaviors. And that is very frightening and 
concerning for the Court as well. 
(Sent. Hr'g Tr., p.21, L.22 - p.27, L.13.) Cobler's arguments regarding his violent 
and unstable childhood, his use of drugs impairing his judgment when he 
committed the crime, his poor impulse control and attention deficit disorder, and 
lack of psychological counseling, may have some relevancy to sentencing, but 
the sentencing court was not required to assess or balance all of the sentencing 
goals in an equal manner, let alone place Cobler's issues above protection of 
society, retribution, or deterrence. See State v. Dushkin, 124 Idaho 184, 186, 
857 P.2d 663, 665 (Ct. App. 1993). Given the facts and circumstances of 
Cobler's criminal conduct, his minimizing of his own culpability and the scope of 
his inappropriate conduct with J.M., and his apparent selfishness and impulsivity, 
the district court's sentence is not excessive. Cobler has failed to establish an 
abuse of discretion, i.e., that no reasonable jurist would have imposed a two year 
fixed term, with eight years indeterminate under the facts of this case 
Cobler Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In The Court's Denial Of His Motion 
To Reduce His Sentence 
Cobler contends the district court abused its discretion by not reducing his 
sentence to five years, with one year fixed, as requested based upon Cobler's 
newly asserted remorse and compliance with prison rules. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.34-35.) Contrary to Cobler's appellate contentions, his Rule 35 motion 
consists primarily of his claims that his conviction was the result of J.M.'s parents' 
vindictive desires and lies arising from their inability to control J.M., his denials of 
manipulating J.M. and reintroducing her to methamphetamine, accusing another 
person of having abusive sexual relations with J.M., and his desire not to have to 
register as a sex offender. (Order augmenting the record dated January 22, 
2008, with item 1, pp.2-5.) 
The standard of review is as set forth in State v. Hernandez, 121 ldaho 
114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 7014-15 (Ct. App. 1991): 
A motion to reduce an otherwise lawful sentence is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the district court. State v. 
Forde, 113 ldaho 21, 740 P.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1987). Such a motion 
is essentially a plea for leniency, which may be granted if the 
sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Lopez, 
106 ldaho 447, 680 P.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1984). The denial of a 
motion for reduction of sentence will not be disturbed absent a 
showing that the court abused its sentencing discretion. The 
criteria for examining rulings denying the leniency requested are 
the same as those applied in determining whether the original 
sentence was reasonable. Lopez, at 450, 680 P.2d at 872. A 
sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time of 
sentencing that confinement is necessary "to accomplish the 
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of 
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution 
applicable to a given case." Sfafe v. ToohiN, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 
650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). If the sentence is not excessive 
when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is 
excessive in view of new or additional information presented with 
his motion for reduction. If he fails to make this showing, we cannot 
say that denial of the motion by the district court represents an 
abuse of discretion. 
Cobler's Rule 35 motion is merely a continuation of the minimization of his 
culpability and his blaming of J.M.'s parents. The district court recognized 
Cobler's minimization and blaming, explaining: 
This was a case involving a young woman who was very fragile, 
both from the standpoint of her mental health as well as her 
substance abuse issues in which this defendant took extreme 
advantage over an extensive period of time. As a result of this 
defendant's actions, along with those of his wife, this victim has 
digressed to the point that she no longer has meaningful contact, 
even with her own family. 
This case involved not only manipulation of the defendant's 
part, put also providing of drugs. This is not a case in which the 
defendant was at or near the age of the victim. This defendant is a 
36 [sic] year old man who was married at the time and knew full 
well of both his sexual contact with a child as well as his wife's. .... 
The defendant, the Court found, was not totally candid in his 
interaction with the psychosexual evaluation as well as the 
presentence investigator. As noted in the psychosexual evaluation, 
he did not view himself as a sexual offender nor did he perceive the 
seventeen year [old] female of this crime to be a victim. Finally, the 
defendant constitutes a moderate probability to commit a future 
sexual offense. The Court had grave concerns about this 
defendant's ability to function on probation and there clearly 
needed to be punishment in this case for his repeated 
transgressions towards a very vulnerable young woman. 
For these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion 
for Reduction of Sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35. 
(Order augmenting the record dated January 22, 2008, with item 4, pp.2-3; Order 
augmenting the record dated April 30, 2008.) In light of the record reflecting 
Cobler's crime and his character and history, his assertions of remorse and good 
prison behavior tempered by his continued minimization and blame of J.M.'s 
parents did not merit a reduced sentence. Cobler has failed to show that the 
district court abused its discretion by denying his request for leniency. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to decline to consider Cobler's 
challenges to the no contact order, affirm his ten year sentence with two years 
fixed, and affirm the district court's order denying his motion for reduction of 
sentence. 
DATED this 16th dav of June 2008. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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